Understanding the Roman Catholic Church in China

I. Introduction

Over the centuries, Christianity attempted on several occasions to take root and flourish in China, but each time it met with very limited success. When foreign missionaries were expelled in the early 1950's, the prevalent opinion was that once more Christianity would almost disappear from China. What a surprise then, when in the early 1980's, The West discovered that the Christian faith not only had survived but was growing. Today in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crisis in international communism, and the rapid socio-economical changes in China, some observers think that Chinese Christianity may well be on the verge of entering its "golden age". May be is the key word; predictions about China have often been proven wrong. Nonetheless signs of a renewed opportunity for Christianity are certainly abundant and call for a cautious optimism.

As many of you know, it is almost impossible to generalize about China because of its vastness and diversity. It’s more like a multicolored mosaic with the reds more pronounced in one area while the yellows or the blues may dominate in others. The same goes for the Roman Catholic Church: the situation varies from place to place. "It is not an exaggeration to say that everything you hear about the church in China is true at some time and at some place; and not true at another time and in another place." My hopes for tonight are twofold: first, to provide an understanding of a church that suffered a lot, is still struggling for unity but is very much alive. And second, especially for those of you who are in the news reporting profession, to dispel some of the misinformation so common in the West and too often rehashed in the press. 

II. A Survey of the Catholic Church between 1950 and 1976 

Most missionaries left China or were expulsed in the early 1950s. Sweeping arrests against Chinese bishops, priests, sisters and laity did not begin however until the fall of 1955. Afterwards, the Catholic resistance movement crushed by mass arrests and condemnations to forced labor went underground. The witness of Bishop Gong Pinmei of Shanghai and many others who chose jail, labor camps, and even death for the sake of their faith and their loyalty to the pope would sustain countless people in the years ahead.

By the late 1957, due to the prior expulsion of foreign bishops and the subsequent imprisonment of Chinese prelates who oppose the regime or rejected the CCPA, 120 out of 145 dioceses and prefectures apostolic were without ordinaries. The clergy in several districts considered filling the vacancies a real apostolic need and, at the urging of their local CCPA branch, began the process of choosing a new bishop. After electing a candidate each, the dioceses of Wuchang and Wuhan in Hubei province telegraphed the names to the Holy See for the pope’s approval. The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith turned down their requests because it saw these independent selections of bishops by the Chinese as an attempt to put in place ‘patriotic” ordinaries who would simply carry out the communist government policy. There is certainly no doubt that the Chinese government was, and still is, trying to exercise a large measure of control over the Church. Yet in all fairness, one has also to acknowledge that the requests came from a Chinese clergy who, in the midst of intense pressures, still acknowledged the pope’s privilege to appoint bishops. Only when their plea was rejected, did they decide to proceed anyway on the ground that the Holy See had failed to realize the difficulty of their situation. On April 13, 1958, patriotic bishop Li Daonan of the neighboring diocese of Puqi performed the consecration of the two bishops in the Hankou cathedral. Thus began the ordinations of bishops sponsored by the CCPA but not recognized by the pope. In Church parlance, such bishops are “illegitimate.”  In canonical terms, however, their consecration although “illicit” remains perfectly “valid. Saddened by the news of the consecration of two new bishops, Pope Pius XII issued the encyclical Ad apostolorum principis in which he expressed his disapproval of the CCPA and reiterated that the authority for making episcopal appointments was his alone. Not unexpectedly, the government reacted by forbidding church authorities to have further contact with the Vatican. A question was even inserted in the ritual of episcopal ordination that made the new bishop-elect promise to “be detached from all control of the Roman Curia.” The intention of the question, as explained by a patriotic bishop, was not to reject papal authority but to object to the Vatican’s rejection of Chinese elected episcopal candidates.(i) Bishops, priests, Sisters and lay people who refused to go along with the government and the Patriotic Association’ stance were sent to jail and to labor camps. The gap between the patriotic and Rome loyalist Catholics had widened even further. By 1962, the number of patriotic bishops had reached 42 while those formerly appointed by Rome had fallen to about 20.

As bad as the situation may look, it did not result in the formation of schismatic Church because the division never amounted to a doctrinal different nor a total breach of communion with the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. Moreover the Holy See has never issued a formal declaration of a Chinese schism nor did it explicitly excommunicate any patriotic bishop. No doubt there are Chinese church officials and lay people who would be happy to have nothing to do with Rome. Only these individuals might be considered schismatic and not the whole portion of the Catholic Church that operates under some control of the government.(ii) With the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, all public religious activities ceased and all church properties were confiscated. Church buildings that were not demolished or badly damaged were converted into factories or storehouses. The Red Guards used torture and beating to force Christians to give up their faith. The CCPA was suspended. Many religious leaders and Christians had to endure public struggle session and were sent to prison and labor camp to join those who in the first place had refused to adhere to the Association. Some bishops and priests married but in most cases these marriages seemed to have been in name only to satisfy government regulations and prove that they had “become men again.” In fact many of these marriages were with religious sisters who otherwise would have had no other means of support. Public church activities in China did not resume until 1971 when two churches reopened in Beijing for the benefit of foreign Protestant and Catholic students and diplomats. In 1976, the ten-year nightmare of the Cultural Revolution came to an end. Religious leaders, priests and sisters were set free and resumed their ministry while the ban on religious belief and practice was relaxed.

III. Freedom of Religion to an Extent

A further sign of a more benevolent attitude toward religion came in 1978 with the reappearance of representatives from the five officially recognized religions−Taoism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam−at the meeting of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. This consultative body has no political power but serves a bridge-building function among the constituencies the constituencies of the delegates, the Communist party, and the government. The CCPA resurfaced and, since 1979, has been instrumental in the return of church properties to their former religious purpose. In 1982, China’s new Constitution dropped the ultra leftist content of the preceding ones and recognized the freedom of religious belief for all Chinese people. The right to engage in “normal” religious activities was also affirmed but has remained strictly controlled by the Religious Affairs Bureau since only what the government permits is considered “normal” and what it does not permit is not only considered “not normal” but can even be construed as illegal. This submission of the Churches to government control is therefore not done without danger of putting the integrity of the faith at some risk and, as aconsequence, of jeopardizing authentic Christian living.

The 1980s saw also the rise of the “Cultural Christians” phenomenon. These Chinese academics and intellectuals read the Bible, study Christian philosophy and theology, and write extensively on religious topics, but for the most part they do not seek baptism or join a Church. Thanks to their translation efforts, important patristic and theological works are now also available in Chinese.

Meanwhile the government, wary of the popular interest in Christianity and the substantial increase in church attendance, spoke of “Christian fever.” It was also worried by the resilience of the Catholic and Protestant Underground composed of Christians who refused to submit to the

control of the TSPM or the CCPA. This led the government in February 1989 to introduce a number of administrative measures to enact a stricter control over the membership and leadership of religious activities—the so-called Document 3. These measures were further clarified in a February 1991 circular—Document 6—which among other things required the registration of all places of religious activities. The ban against the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July 1999 has since further intensified the nationwide crackdown on all unauthorized religious activities. Arrests of Protestants and Catholics who gather without official permission have been on the rise. In some regions of Fujian and Zhejiang for instance, every time they built a church, the police systematically tears it down. Even harsher has been the treatment of Protestant Evangelicals whose illegal gatherings the police construes as prohibited cult activities rather than services belonging to one of the five recognized religions. As of 2002, the Communist regime still pursues a policy of allowing registered Christian communities to develop while eradicating many others. There are over 17,000 registered Protestant and Catholic churches, but this number falls short of meeting the needs of the widely spread and growing Christian communities.

Even with the reopening of China to the West, religious activities of foreigners within China have remained strictly controlled. The issuance in September 2000 of a new set of government regulations has added fresh measures to restrictions already spelled out in 1994 and 1995. Except for the attendance to religious services at lawfully registered monasteries, temples, mosques and churches, foreigners cannot engage in religious activities or friendly cultural and academic exchanges with Chinese religious circles without the prior approval of Chinese religious bodies. For Catholics this means the permission of the CCPA at the county or even the provincial level. The regulations make it difficult for foreigners to contact underground communities and further curtail the communities’ influence in government-approved religious bodies.

IV. Towards Reconciliation within the Chinese Catholic Church

First of all, let it be clear that, contrary to what some organizations like the Cardinal Kung Foundation like to report, the Roman Catholic church in China is one church and not two churches: One faithful to Rome and the other not. It is certainly a wounded and divided church but there has never been a schism within that church because no breach of faith exists between a particular segment of the Chinese Catholic Church and the worldwide Roman Catholic Church. In fact there are more and more hopeful signs that healing and reconciliation between the different segments are in the making.

The reality of the Roman Catholic Church in China remains complex and is still evolving. As of today, it exists under several forms, the two extremes being most talked about being one that is recognized by the government and one that is not while in fact more and more Catholic believers belongs to a the gray area of the in between category. The government-recognized part of the Catholic Church functions openly in churches registered with the government and is linked to the CCPA. It is therefore often referred to as the Open Church guanfang or gongkai jiaohui. The other extreme, often referred to as the Underground Church dixia jiaohui, refuses any control from the CCPA and usually operates in private homes or buildings without seeking government approval.

There are no perfect terms to identify these two clearly distinct manifestations of the Catholic Church. I like expressions that state things as they are without passing judgment. So I would recommend staying away from labels like Patriotic Church to describe the government recognized segment of the Church because it implies either that all its members belong to the CCPA or that the underground is not patriotic minded, neither of these being true. In the same way, the names Suffering Church and Loyal Church to describe the Underground segment of the church are wrong and divisive as they imply that the government-recognized has not suffered and is not loyal to the pope.

Chinese Catholics all love their country: their moral values and hard-work habits make them model citizens and therefore “patriotic.” The vast majority worship openly or would like to do so provided they would not be controlled by the CCPA. Many, even in the government-recognized, remain suspicious of the CCPA and would like to see it disappear.

A. The Government-Recognized Segment of the Catholic Church

Although its roots can be traced back to the emergence of the CCPA in 1957, the division itself became really apparent only after the clergy returned to their dioceses in 1978 and 1979. Since the new policy of the government allowed them to function in public, rather than in hiding, many did so. With less than 30 bishops still alive, some who had been imprisoned for their unswerving loyalty to the pope and had refused any relationship with the CCPA were now more willing to cooperate with the association for the future of the Catholic Church in China. After 1981, the requirement in force since 1958 that both consecrators and consecrated ones should swear their independence from Rome was dropped and resulted in more priests willing to accept the episcopal ordination. Several of these bishops have secretly obtained legitimization of their status from the pope. Some even actively sought higher positions within the CCPA in order to influence its decision and curb its tendency toward unilateral control.

In late May 1980 more than two hundred delegates representing the government-registered Catholic Church gathered in Beijing to attend the Third National Convention of the CCPA and the National Catholic Representatives Assembly. These two meetings held back to back resulted in a major reorganization of structures within the Open Church with the creation of two additional national organizations: the Chinese Catholic Church Administrative Commission and the Chinese Catholic Bishops’ Conference. From this point forward, the CCPA relinquished its role as overseer of all Church concerns, relegating itself to look after external affairs and church state relations. Responsibility for doctrinal and pastoral affairs was given over to the clergy and church leaders. In 1992, further reorganization placed the Bishops’ Conference on an equal footing with the CCPA while reducing the Church Administrative Commission to a committee responsible for pastoral affairs under the control of the Bishops’ Conference. Five additional committees were also set up to oversee Seminary Education, Liturgy, Theological Study, Finance Development, and International Relationships. Initiatives in the areas of pastoral work, training of clergy and in the social apostolate of the Church indicate that the new structures are effectively implemented.

With many ups and downs, the Open Church’ attitude toward papal primacy has gradually improved. The prayer for the pope that had been removed from the book of Collection of Important Prayers was reintroduced in 1982. In February 1989, the already mentioned Document 3 of the government allowed spiritual affiliation with the Holy See, so in April of the same year the Bishops’ Conference promptly acknowledged the pope as the spiritual leader of the Chinese Church. By the end of the decades, most congregations had also restored the prayer for the pope during Mass.

B. The Underground Segment of the Catholic Church

Many clergy released at the end of the Cultural Revolution were still unwilling to join any Catholic organization registered with the government. They refused to live at a church with other priests who had married, had betrayed others, or had publicly denied the primacy of the pope. Therefore they carried out religious activities in private, and gradually attracted a great number of Catholics to join with them. Bishop Fan Xueyan of Baoding diocese in Hebei province was released in 1979 and acted as the leader of the Underground Church.

Recognizing that urgent need for bishops in several dioceses, he ordained in 1981 three bishops without recourse to government or Open Church’s approval. When the pope learned of the circumstances that prompted such a procedure, he legitimized the new bishops and granted them and Bishop Fan special faculties to ordain successors a well as bishops for vacant seats of neighboring dioceses. By 1989 the Underground Church had more than fifty bishops who set up their own episcopal conference. Rome also gave underground bishops the authority to ordain priests without the required lengthy seminary training. This has accounted for the overall poor doctrinal instruction of many priests in the Underground. . Moreover, signs of excess and lack of coordination have appeared with some dioceses having as many as three bishops claiming to be the legitimate ordinary.

Since 1989, the Underground Church has been the target of mounting pressure from the government. The same government document of February 1989 that recognized the spiritual leadership of the pope spelled out how to deal with the Underground Church. Communist cadres were asked to differentiate between underground forces that clang to their hostility and stirred up believers and those who did not join the Open Church because of their faith in the pope. The formers, said the document, must be dealt with severely while patience should be used with the others. Accordingly the government regarded the setting up of an episcopal conference by the clandestine bishops in November 1989 as a provocation. It resulted in the arrest of several leaders including Bishop Fan. At the local level the implementation of that policy has remained vague and vacillating, resulting in sporadic destruction of unregistered religious buildings, temporary detention and the levy of heavy fines. However, since the ban of the Falun Gong in July 1999, repressive measures against not officially registered Catholic communities have also greatly increased. Several priests and bishops remain in prison or have their activities curtailed. Many Underground Catholics play a prophetic role by their refusal to participate in a government-sanctioned organization. They dare to challenge the government policy regarding human rights and freedom of religion from a Catholic standpoint.

C. Reconciliation in the Making

The bitter division has pitted those who chose to worship under the supervision of the government and those who refused to do so. During the past twenty years the two sides have gradually moved away from mistrust and bitter accusations to an attitude of understanding respect and to concrete acts of cooperation and genuine efforts at reconciliation. The dividing lines between the two are becoming increasingly blurred. Fidelity to the Holy See has become less of an issue since the pope has legitimized most the bishops in the Open Church and a number of new ones are being ordained with his approval. For an ever-growing number of clergy, sisters and ordinary Christians, the division does not make much sense anymore. Many in a courageous and prophetic manner act as bridges between both sides of the Church. Pope John Paul II has made repeated pleas to the Catholics of China to display toward one another “a love which consists of understanding, respect, forbearance, forgiveness and reconciliation.” In many ways a complete normalization of diplomatic relations between China and the Vatican cannot happen unless reconciliation first occurs within the Chinese Catholic Church itself.

V. Sino-Vatican Relations

Informal talks between the Vatican and the PRC about the normalization of diplomatic relations have taken places off and on since the late 1980s. Beijing realizes that it has much to gain from restoring such ties but insists on two main points: Rome should sever its relations with Taiwan and not interfere with the election of bishops. The Vatican sees in the diplomatic normalization a greater freedom for the Church and possibilities for a solid implantation. Church officials have indicated that they were ready to establish relations with Beijing, but that it was first necessary to reach an agreement over the Holy See’s relationship with Chinese Catholics. In late 1999, the news spread that both sides had made substantial progress toward breaching the gap between Beijing’s demand for a total and complete independence of the Chinese Church and Rome’s insistence on an autonomous Chinese church in communion with the pope and the universal Church. But during the course of the year 2000, two events—the ordinations of bishops without papal mandate on January 6 and 25, and Rome’s canonization of 120 China martyrs on October 1—have seriously undermined the process. These misunderstandings point to the distance that still separates the Holy See and the Chinese government.

A. The Election of Bishops

This constitutes a major source of contention between China and the Holy See. Canon Law #377 states clearly that “the supreme pontiff freely appoints bishops or confirms those lawfully elected.” So Rome refuses to sanction any bishops named independently by Chinese or any other civil authority while Beijing defies church laws and claims the right to appoint bishops since 1958. Meanwhile Rome through secret channels has authorized the ordination of underground bishops. Therefore presently they are four categories of Bishops in China:

- Underground bishops: they are recognized by the pope but with very few exceptions are not approved by the government.

- Illicit open-Church bishops: they are approved by the Chinese government but not recognized by the pope.

- Legitimized open-Church bishops: they are approved by the Chinese government and were ordained without the consent of Rome. They have however subsequently contacted the Holy See and been recognized by the Pope. They are therefore not illicit anymore, but only Rome knows their exact number. The consensus is that nowadays the majority of bishops in the Open Church are in that category.

- Licit open-Church bishops: those are bishops recently ordained with the approval of the government but who prior to their ordination seek and receive the approval of Rome.

Circumstances surrounding the January 6, 2000, ordination of five bishops not approved by the Holy See clearly point to a rift within the Open Church. We know now that original plans called for an even larger ordination ceremony but that only five succumbed to the pressure of the government and the national CCPA to be ordained without seeking prior papal approval. Several Open Church bishops disapproved and refused to attend the ceremony and so did the teachers and the seminarians of the national seminary in Beijing. This clearly shows that the mood within the Open Church is to be totally in accordance with church laws. Repressive measures from the government have been unable to reverse the trend. How the Vatican chooses bishops in China remains a problem but not an insoluble one. A likely compromise is for the Vatican to choose bishops in consultation with the Chinese government. But no agreement can be reached until the two sides resume dialogue.

B. The Canonization

On October 1, 2000, as a proud China celebrated its 51st anniversary, the worldwide Roman Catholic Church proclaimed saints 120 Catholics who died on Chinese soil, 86 of them at the hands of the Boxers. This chain of events resulted in a bitter exchange of words between the two parties that once more derailed precarious efforts toward reestablishing diplomatic relations. The history of turbulent relations between China and the Catholic Church is littered with elements of cultural disparity, which in this instance centered on the meaning attached to dates.

The Month of October in Modern Chinese History

For Chinese people, October dates are beacons that highlight key events in the transformation of a nineteenth century weak and crumbling empire into a contemporary proud and rapidly modernizing nation. On this journey, October 18, 1860 stands as a stern reminder of how low China had fallen. Beijing abandoned by the court fell prey to British and French troops that ransacked and burned down the magnificent summer palace resort known as the Yuanming Yuan. Forty years later precisely during this same month of October, another rampaging foreign force was too in the midst of pillaging the capital that had been once again forsaken by the court. By contrast, Oct. 10, 1911 (the beginning of the republican revolution), and Oct. 1, 1949 (the birth of the PRC) stand as symbols of the indomitable spirit of the Chinese people and their resolve to forge their own destiny.

In October 1999, I became acutely aware of the dual significance of these dates being passed on to news generations when a young Shanghai student told me how me learned in school that, in October 1860, foreign troops humiliated China by destroying and looting many of its national treasures. I could not but wonder. Did he also know that the execution of Father Auguste Chapdelaine in 1856 gave France a pretext for joining forces with Great Britain? Was he told that Catholic missionaries in Beijing celebrated the allied victory with a religious service of thanksgiving and a prayer for Emperor Napoleon III? A few days later, I saw the same student and his friends proudly waving flags while millions of Chinese viewers watched on TV the lavish celebration of China's 50th anniversary. The following October, I noticed that exhibits and even websites commemorating events that shook China in a hundred years before in 1900 focused more on the destruction caused by the Baguo lianjun—the international force sent to relieved the beleaguered legations of Beijing—than on the turmoil fomented by the Boxers.

The Month of October in Roman Catholic Devotions

In the Catholic Church, October is also punctuated by important celebrations. First it is the month of Our Lady of the Rosary. At Lepanto on October 7, 1571, Christian forces crushed the Ottoman Empire's Muslim forces that threatened to overrun Western Europe. Subsequently, a feast in honor of Mary was established on that day because the victory was attributed to her in response to the prayer of the rosary by Catholic faithful. Gradually, the entire month became dedicated to her through the daily recitation of the rosary.

Western missionaries brought to China the cult of Mary and the recitation of the rosary so much so that in some part of Hebei Catholics are know as "Old Rosary Sayers." Today, the two most common pictures found in Catholic churches and homes are still those of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and of the Virgin Mary and the most popular form of devotion remains the prayers of the rosary. There is no doubt that the easy acceptance of the cult of Mary by converts was due partly to her resemblance to Guanyin, the Buddhist goddess of mercy, and to the striking similarity between the rosary and the Buddhist prayer beads. But even more significant for Catholic communities so often in the minority and always at the mercy of persecutions must have been the portrayal of Mary as the one who helps in periods of trials and protects against enemies' attacks.

In 1900 Zhili province, one intriguing detail found in church accounts of attacks against Catholic villages was the sighting of a mysterious lady dressed in white who seemed to float over the place and scared the Boxers away. The apparitions were invariably linked to the unrelenting prayers of the Catholic community, especially the recitation of the rosary. I wonder if some of my colleagues more familiar than I am with non-Christian sources on the Boxers have found references to sightings of this mysterious lady in white. The most spectacular and publicized apparition occurred in June 1900 at Donglü near Baoding. In thanksgiving the villagers built a shrine to Mary, help of Christians and queen of China, which until today remains the most revered Marian pilgrimage site on Chinese soil.

October is also often referred to as Mission Month because special emphasis is put on reminding Catholic faithful of their responsibility to ensure that the Christian belief is spread to the entire world. The month opens with the feast of St. Theresa of the Holy Child, patron saint of missions. Although she was a cloistered nun who never went to a foreign country to preach the Gospel, she spent her life praying for the conversion of non-Christians. Chinese Catholics have a great devotion to St Theresa with whom they readily identify because, not being allowed to preach openly the Gospel, they too rely on the power of prayer.

Each October, the third or fourth Sunday is set aside as Mission Sunday to promote mission awareness among the faithful and to secure funding for the missionary enterprise. Since it was established in 1926, Mission Sunday has been closely related to China because it was on the 28^th of October that year that the first six Chinese bishops of modern times were ordained by Pope Pius XI in Rome.

Mission Sunday is emphasized by a papal message that always pays special tribute to those who died a violent death because of their faith. The year 2000 being a "jubilee year," that is a most holy year to mark the beginning of the third millennium of the Christian era, Pope John Paul II stressed even more the "indispensable" role of martyrs in the development of the church. But more than that, he opened Mission Month with the canonization of 120 martyrs who died in China. What prompted the decision was the fact that close to 75 percent of these people added to the list of saints were killed by the Boxers exactly 100 years earlier.

Rome acknowledged that the canonization had been postponed several times in the past because it was a "highly sensitive question." Yet this time, it went ahead insisting the decision was "a purely religious matter" with no political overtone. It simply "rendered justice to the historical reality" of some thirty thousand innocent people killed by "Boxer rebels." Pointing to another historical reality, Beijing, on the other end, denounced the event as a painful reminder of how until recently missionaries and Chinese converts had been agents and lackeys of colonialist and imperialist nations. It called the canonization ceremony of October 1 an "open insult" to the Chinese people who on that same day celebrated the 51st anniversary of getting rid of all foreign control and aggression. In stark contrast, when a few months earlier the Russian Orthodox Church canonized 222 Chinese Orthodox martyrs, the Chinese government did not raise any criticism. Many of these Christians were killed during the nights of June 11 and 24, 1900, during the same Boxer uprising.

On October 24, 2001, almost a year after the canonization dispute, the pope acknowledged that historically members of the church had had to work within the context of “complex historical events and conflicting political interests,” and that their work “was not always without errors.” These errors, the pope said, “may have given the impression of a lack of esteem for the Chinese people on the part of the Catholic Church, making them feel that the Church was motivated by feelings of hostility towards China. For all this I ask forgiveness and understanding of those who may have felt hurt in some way by such actions on the part of Christians.” But this was not enough for China. On October 30, a Chinese spokesperson, although viewing the apology as “a positive move,” said that the pope had “not made a clear-cut apology for the canonization incident, which seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.”

Since the beginning of this year, the Chinese government has sent mixed signals as to its readiness to resume talks with the Vatican.

VI. The Catholic Church at the Turn of Twenty- First Century

In 1950, China had a Catholic population of about three million plus with 1,900 Chinese priests and 3,700 Chinese sisters. In 1980, it was estimated that less than 1,300 elderly Chinese priests were actively engaged in ministry. The fate of Chinese sisters had not been less terrible than that of priests and seminarians and by 1980, just over one thousand remained. Obviously the training of new church leaders and the reopening of seminaries and novitiates was a most urgent priority. Sheshan Regional Seminary near Shanghai was the first Catholic house of formation to reopen in 1982. At the turn of the 21st century, 24 major seminaries are allowed to operate with government permission and another 10 exits in the Underground Church. Altogether they house 1,700 seminarians. Sisters in formation total 2,500 spread over 40 novitiates in the Open Church and 20 in the Underground, With a total of 2,200 priests and 3,600 sisters, the number of religious workers seems on the rebound. Churches and chapels reopened to the cult with government approval have multiplied and stand at 5,500. The Catholic Church population is  estimated at 12 million plus, but this fourfold growth is not so significant when we realize that percentage wise this is only one percent of the population or about where it stood in 1949. By comparison the Chinese Protestant Church has displayed much more vitality by growing from less than three million to at least twenty-five million members. Factors behind the slow growth of the Catholic Church are complex and many, one being certainly the bitter inner dispute that has just begun to fade away.

The Catholic Church educational activities came to an abrupt end in the 1950s. In the early  1980s, under the impetus of Deng Xiaoping, private schools reemerged but the government made a clear distinction between private schools as houses of religious formation and training, and private schools as alternative options within the public education system. While the five recognized religions of Taoism, Buddhism, Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism are permitted to open the first kind under certain conditions, they are barred of any involvement in public education. In July 1997, the State Council of the People's Republic of China issued a long decree that gave private schools official recognition by integrating them into the overall Socialist educational enterprise. It encouraged social organizations to engage in all domains of educational activities, higher education, compulsory nine years of primary and middle schools, preschools, and even vocational and adult training. But among the long list of regulations, first and foremost stood the stern reminder that "no social organization is allowed to operate open or covert religious schools." This provision came as a big disappointment for the government recognized

Open Church because, despite the greater freedom it has enjoyed in recent years, it finds itself still barred from entering the field of education. Neither can it "interfere with the State's education" nor can the State "use religion in its own service."

Yet in a country where Church educational activities remain drastically curtailed, Catholic publishing houses such as Sapientia Press in Beijing, Guangqi Press in Shanghai and Hebei Faith Press in Shijiazhuang, together with the Protestant Amity Press in Nanjing, are important means for reaching and educating a great number of Christian and non-Christian Chinese. They publish the Bible and Christian literature and journals. They have also reprinted in simplified characters many of recent years’ Chinese translations coming from Taiwan and Hong Kong such as the documents of Vatican II, the liturgy of the Mass, the new code of Canon Law and the new Universal Catechism (The Catechism of the Catholic Church). Unfortunately, excerpt for the official journal of the CCPA Zhongguo Tianzhujiao (The Catholic Church in China) that can be ordered through the mail, all other Church publications remain subject to the government censure and are allowed to be sold only on church premises.

The Hebei Catholic press also publishes a biweekly newspaper called Xinde (Faith). In spite of the restriction just mentioned, it has a distribution of 45,000 copies throughout most of the provinces of China, which amounts to a readership of over half a million people in the Underground and Open Catholic Church as well as among non-Christians. Besides relaying news of the Church within and outside China, the newspaper also encourages readers to act responsively by sending funds for various charitable causes and major catastrophes. Responses have been so enthusiastic that it has led to the establishment of a Catholic social service center called Beifang Jinde (Progress) to handle donations for charity work in society.

VII. Conclusion

The present policy of the Chinese government to keep control over religions should not surprise us. After all, since the third century BC, Chinese emperors have always taken an active interest in regulating religions. As for outside organizations that propagate a confrontational and adversarial position on the situation of the Chinese Church, they are in direct defiance of the pope’s pleas for understanding, forgiveness, reconciliation and unity among Chinese Catholics. The Chinese Catholic Church today is quite different even from what it was in the 1980s when it emerged from long years of repression. It is growing in numbers, enjoying relative freedom of worship, and experiencing a renewal of vocations to the priesthood and religious life. In this presentation, I have alluded to several difficult and constraining realities:

- Chinese Church issues: reconciliation within itself and with Rome.

- Political issues of the relationship between the Chinese government, the Chinese Church and the Vatican

- Social issues: Religious freedom as linked to freedom of thought and expression, At the same time Chinese society is also undergoing profound social and economic changes. This transformation is confronting the church with new issues and challenges as it begins to shed its ghetto mentality and to fulfill a meaningful role for various segments of the society.

Jean-Paul Wiest

Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese Society

Presentation made at The French Centre For Research on Contemporary China

Hong Kong

June 20th, 2002

i For more on this question, see Kim-Kwong Chan, Towards a Contextual Ecclesiology: The Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China (1979-1983): Its Life and Theological Implications ( Hong Kong: Chinese Church Research Center, 1987), pp. 81-82, 443-448. Chan also points out that Church patriotic leaders were careful in their use of expressions. They “usually employed terms like ‘Roman Curia’ and ‘the Vatican’ instead of terms like ‘the Holy See’ or ‘the Apostolic See.’ The former denotes political status whereas the latter terms signify the religious and ecclesiatical dimension.” (p. 79).

ii On this question, see the excellent article of Geoffrey King, “A Schismatic Church?—A Canonical Evaluation in Edmond Tang and Jean-Paul Wiest, eds., The Catholic Church in Modern China: Perspectives (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 19930, pp. 80-102. An explicit decree of excommunication was issued to the vicar-general of Nanjing, Li Weiguang , for publishing a declaration promoting the communist interpretation of the three autonomies and accusing the pope and his nuncio of collusion with the imperialists. But this excommunication took place before Li’s ordination as a bishop without Rome’s approval.